Publikationen
- Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment, Experimental Econonomics, forthcoming (J. P. Reiss mit Irenaeus Wolff).
- Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, forthcoming (J. P. Reiss mit Christian Korth).
- An experimental investigation of rating-market regulation, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 144, 78-86, 2017 (Martin Schmidt mit Claudia Keser, Asri Özgümüs und Emmanuel Peterlé).
- Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogeneous Endowments and Voluntary Public-good Provision, Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 291-310, 2017 (Martin Schmidt mit Claudia Keser und Andreas Markstädter).
- Product Lines, Product Design, and Limited Attention, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 119, 437–456, 2015 (Markus Fels mit Carsten Dahremöller).
- On the value of information: Why people reject medical tests, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2015 (Markus Fels).
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Measuring the distribution of spitefulness, PLoS ONE, 7(8), e41812, 2012 (J. P. Reiss mit Erik O. Kimbrough).
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Out-of-equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids?, Economic Journal, 121(557), 1361-1397, 2011 (J. P. Reiss mit Oliver Kirchkamp).
- First price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model, Economic Theory, 43(1), 99-141, 2010 (J. P. Reiss mit Jens Robert Schöndube).
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Outside options: Another reason to choose the first‐price auction, European Economic Review, 53(2), 2009 (J. P. Reiss mit Oliver Kirchkamp und Eva Poen).
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Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first price procurement auctions: An experimental study, Games and Economic Behavior 58(1), 2007 (J. P. Reiss mit Jeannette Brosig).
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The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe: an overview, Acta Oeconomica 56 (4), 2006 (J. P. Reiss mit Heinz Handler, Bertrand Koebel, Margit Schratzenstaller).
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Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth, Journal of Macroeconomics 27, 69-86, 2005 (J. P. Reiss mit Lutz Weinert).
Working Papers
- Can we overcome the Winner’s Curse by (behavioral) auction design? (J. P. Reiss mit Dan Levin). [Screenshots]
- Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders—Theory and Experiment (J. P. Reiss mit Oliver Kirchkamp).
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Reducing risk in experimental games and individual choice (J. P. Reiss mit Claudia Niemeyer und Karim Sadrieh).
- When the affordable has no value and the valuable is unaffordable: The U.S. market for long-term care insurance and the role of Medicaid (Markus Fels).
- Mental Accounting, Access Motives, and Overinsurance (Markus Fels).
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A pure variation of risk in private‐value auctions (J. P. Reiss mit Oliver Kirchkamp und Karim Sadrieh).
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Behavioural Variation in Tullock Contests (J. P. Reiss mit Aidas Masiliunas und Friederike Mengel).
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Funding entrepreneurs: An experimental approach (J. P. Reiss mit Irenaeus Wolff).
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Limited Attention and the Demand for Health Insurance (Markus Fels).
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Optimal auctions with outside competition (J. P. Reiss).
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On the convergence speed in growth models (J. P. Reiss).
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Auctioning small ticket items competitively: A natural field Experiment (J. P. Reiss).
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Custom-Made Healthcare – An Experimental Investigation, cege Discussion Paper 218, Göttingen (Martin Schmidt mit Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette und Cornelius Schnitzler).