Research Topics of the Section Industrial Organization
Publications and Working Papers
- Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment, Experimental Econonomics, forthcoming (J. P. Reiss joint with Irenaeus Wolff).
- Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, forthcoming (J. P. Reiss joint with Christian Korth).
- Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogeneous Endowments and Voluntary Public-good Provision, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming - available online (Martin Schmidt joint with Claudia Keser and Andreas Markstädter).
- Product Lines, Product Design, and Limited Attention, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 119, 437–456, 2015 (Markus Fels joint with Carsten Dahremöller).
- On the value of information: Why people reject medical tests, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2015 (Markus Fels).
Measuring the distribution of spitefulness, PLoS ONE, 7(8), e41812, 2012 (J. P. Reiss joint with Erik O. Kimbrough).
Out-of-equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids?, Economic Journal, 121(557), 1361-1397, 2011 (J. P. Reiss joint with Oliver Kirchkamp).
- First price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model, Economic Theory, 43(1), 99-141, 2010 (J. P. Reiss joint with Jens Robert Schöndube).
Outside options: Another reason to choose the first‐price auction, European Economic Review, 53(2), 2009 (J. P. Reiss joint with Oliver Kirchkamp and Eva Poen).
Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first price procurement auctions: An experimental study, Games and Economic Behavior 58(1), 2007 (J. P. Reiss joint with Jeannette Brosig).
The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe: an overview, Acta Oeconomica 56 (4), 2006 (J. P. Reiss joint with Heinz Handler, Bertrand Koebel, Margit Schratzenstaller).
Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth, Journal of Macroeconomics 27, 69-86, 2005 (J. P. Reiss joint with Lutz Weinert).
- Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders—Theory and Experiment (J. P. Reiss joint with Oliver Kirchkamp).
- Reducing risk in experimental games and individual choice (J. P. Reiss joint with Claudia Niemeyer and Karim Sadrieh).
- When the affordable has no value and the valuable is unaffordable: The U.S. market for long-term care insurance and the role of Medicaid (Markus Fels).
- Mental Accounting, Access Motives, and Overinsurance (Markus Fels).
- A pure variation of risk in private‐value auctions (J. P. Reiss joint with Oliver Kirchkamp and Karim Sadrieh).
- Could we overcome the Winner’s Curse by (behavioral) auction design? (J. P. Reiss joint with Dan Levin).
- Behavioural Variation in Tullock Contests (J. P. Reiss joint with Aidas Masiliunas and Friederike Mengel).
- Funding entrepreneurs: An experimental approach (J. P. Reiss joint with Irenaeus Wolff).
- Limited Attention and the Demand for Health Insurance (Markus Fels).
- Optimal auctions with outside competition (J. P. Reiss).
- On the convergence speed in growth models (J. P. Reiss).
- Auctioning small ticket items competitively: A natural field Experiment (J. P. Reiss).
- An Experimental Investigation of Rating-Market Regulation, cege Discussion Paper 299, Göttingen (Martin Schmidt joint with Claudia Keser, Asri Özgümüs and Emmanuel Peterlé).
- Custom-Made Healthcare – An Experimental Investigation, cege Discussion Paper 218, Göttingen (Martin Schmidt joint with Claudia Keser, Claude Montmarquette and Cornelius Schnitzler).
- Social Costs of Inequality - Heterogeneous Endowments in Public-Good Experiments, cege Discussion Paper 217, Göttingen (Martin Schmidt joint with Claudia Keser, Andreas Markstädter and Cornelius Schnitzler).