- Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment, Experimental Econonomics, forthcoming (joint with Irenaeus Wolff).
- Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, forthcoming (joint with Christian Korth).
Measuring the distribution of spitefulness, PLoS ONE, 7(8), e41812, 2012 (joint with Erik O. Kimbrough).
Out-of-equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids?, Economic Journal, 121(557), 1361-1397, 2011 (joint with Oliver Kirchkamp).
- First price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model, Economic Theory, 43(1), 99-141, 2010 (joint with Jens Robert Schöndube).
Outside options: Another reason to choose the first‐price auction, European Economic Review, 53(2), 2009 (joint with Oliver Kirchkamp and Eva Poen).
Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first price procurement auctions: An experimental study, Games and Economic Behavior 58(1), 2007 (joint with Jeannette Brosig).
The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe: an overview, Acta Oeconomica 56 (4), 2006 (joint with Heinz Handler, Bertrand Koebel, Margit Schratzenstaller).
Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth, Journal of Macroeconomics 27, 69-86, 2005 (joint with Lutz Weinert).
- Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders—Theory and Experiment (joint with Oliver Kirchkamp).
- Reducing risk in experimental games and individual choice (joint with Claudia Niemeyer and Karim Sadrieh).
- A pure variation of risk in private‐value auctions (joint with Oliver Kirchkamp and Karim Sadrieh).
- Could we overcome the Winner’s Curse by (behavioral) auction design? (joint with Dan Levin).
- Behavioural Variation in Tullock Contests (joint with Aidas Masiliunas and Friederike Mengel).
- Funding entrepreneurs: An experimental approach (joint with Irenaeus Wolff).
- Optimal auctions with outside competition.
- On the convergence speed in growth models.
- Auctioning small ticket items competitively: A natural field Experiment.